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Cyber-Terrorism: Legal Principle and Law
in the United Kingdom
Clive Walker*
I. The Ethics of Responding to Terrorism
The capacity of terrorists to terrorise must be taken seriously.
Governments and citizens of the United Kingdom may have become
inured to the phenomenon of terrorism by thirty years of Irish political
violence. Nevertheless, the impact of September 1 1 th has been striking,
not only in the United Kingdom but throughout the world, especially
within the United States. The disbelief and incomprehension as to what
lies behind the attacks, the wayward calculations of danger, and the
reactive destruction of revered norms and processes are all evidence of a
traumatised polity.' As a result of this evident capacity of terrorism to
destabilise and damage otherwise just and democratic societies, those
societies have a right to engage in forward planning and counter-
measures. In the words of one American judge, a democracy is not a
"suicide pact," and measures can be taken against clear and present
dangers.2 This point is also reflected in Article 17 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950,
which states:
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set
forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided
* Professor of Criminal Justice Studies, Centre for Criminal Justice Studies,
School of Law, University of Leeds. The author thanks the organizers and participants at
the ESRC Seminar on Cybercrime (Leeds, April 2002) and the Free Speech Forum
(Leeds, May 2005).
1. See generally LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW
NORMAL (2003) (documenting the expansion of executive authority and the abandonment
of democratic procedural safeguards).
2. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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for in the Convention.
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So, while terrorism is certainly to be counteracted, we must consider
whether there is a need to react to cyber-terrorism and if so, to what
extent?
The first step in the argument should be to impose firm principle on
any legal initiative. As has been explained elsewhere, full constitutional
governance requires continual application of a number of elements.4 The
first is a "rights audit" which means that the rights of individuals are
respected according to traditions of the domestic jurisdictions and the
demands of international law.5 The latter will include the periodic
review of the very existence of any emergency or special measures. 6 The
second element is "democratic accountability" which includes attributes
such as information, open and independent debate, and an ability to
participate in decision making. 7  The third element is
"constitutionalism'--the subjection of government to norms, whether
legal or extra legal (such as codes).8 More specific requirements in the
field of special powers include the public articulation of reasons in
support of particular actions taken for the public welfare, assurances
through effective mechanisms that the crisis cannot be ended by normal
means and that powers will not be used arbitrarily and are proportionate
to the threat, and adherence to the overall purpose of the restoration of
fundamental features of constitutional life. 9  Constitutionalism also
requires that, at a more individual level, excesses can be challenged,
including through the courts.
Bearing these standards in mind, especially the latter, the nature of
the threat of terrorism and cyber-terrorism should next be considered. As
for terrorism, it must be borne in mind that resort to violence is almost
certainly a breach of law without having any need for special measures to
bring about that depiction. Consequently, in light of the need for
proportionality under the heading of constitutionalism, let us consider
why special laws might be needed. The answer lies not in the motivation
3. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, ETS 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 17. See also COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GUIDELINES ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM (3d ed., Strasbourg 2005).
4. Clive Walker, Constitutional Governance and Special Powers against
Terrorism, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 7-10 (1997). See also C. WALKER & J.
BRODERICK, THE CIVIL CONTINGENCIES ACT 2004: RISK, RESILIENCE AND THE LAW IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM chs. 6-7 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) [hereinafter
WALKER, CIVIL CONTINGENCIES].
5. Id. at 7.
6. Id. at 8.
7. Id. at 9.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 9-10.
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per se. Whilst motivation may be a necessary defining factor in the
ascription of the label "terrorism,"' 0 it is not a sufficient defining factor
in the invocation of a special legal response. A special response may
typically be justifiable when terrorism is emanating from a group with
capacities to organise collectively on a sustained basis, to engage in
sophisticated plans and operations, and to operate independently from
normal life or to have the capacity to intimidate normal society into
tolerating its presence. If those factors are present, one might concede
the need to depart from normal laws of criminal detection and process
which often assume (and rely upon) the opposites: lone individuals,
inadequate, bungling operations, and individuals who cannot help but
leave traces of their wrongdoing and who are powerless to stop being
picked up by the forces of law and order. Groups such as the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) certainly fall into the former rather than the
latter criteria. By contrast, the Unabomber 1' or someone like David
Copeland, 2 whose case is discussed below, could be said to engage in
terrorism, but lack the capacity to create a threat of a kind which requires
special laws. Even organisations which seek political change and use
violence to achieve it, but do not have the sophistication, size or threat of
the likes of Irish paramilitary groups, should be tackled through normal
laws rather than special laws. In practice, this demarcation is recognised
by the United Kingdom authorities who have as a matter of policy
declined to treat amateurish animal rights extremists as "terrorists" even
though they apparently fit the definitional profile 13 and have been
described as replicating "a quasi-terrorist cellular structure." 14 It follows
that any definitional precision surrounding the term "terrorism" may be
more apparent than real and, even if achieved, there would still be a role
for further modes of governance over police action in response to
terrorism.
These observations in turn lead us to examine the legal definition of
"terrorism." An immediate criticism is that concentration upon the legal
definition of terrorism is a positivist, facile solution to the problem.
There may be three responses. First, the focus of this paper is legal
10. Andrew Silke, Here Be Dragons, CYBERCRIME: IMMATERIAL CRIME AND
POLICING IMMATERIALITY COLLOQUIUM 3 (Economic and Social Research Council 2002).
11. Theodore Kaczynski was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1998 for bombings
over a number of years which killed three people and maimed two others. Giles Whittell,
Unabomber to End His Days in Prison, THE TIMES (London), May 5, 1998; see also THE
SACRAMENTO BEE, Unabomber, http://www.unabombertrial.com (last visited Nov. 30,
2005).
12. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., HOME OFFICE, ANIMAL RIGHTS EXTREMIsM 3.75 (2001).
14. UNITED KINGDOM DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, ANIMAL WELFARE-
HUMAN RIGHTS: PROTECTING PEOPLE FROM ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, para. 43 (2004).
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principle and legal action, so it is already operating within parameters set
by the legal system. Those who wish to go outside those parameters
must read other papers. Second, the positing of a definition by the legal
system is an authoritative process-law is invested with its own majesty
which brooks no argument (save amongst lawyers and judges). In other
words, like it or not, the legal definition will be played out in court, and
real people will suffer real consequences as a result. The same does not
necessarily apply to the definitions devised by political scientists or
sociologists. Third, those readers who do care to venture into the realms
of political or social science will find no end of disagreement and
confusion. One author has noted, "Above the gates of hell is the warning
that all that enter should abandon hope. Less dire but to the same effect
is the warning given to those who try to define terrorism."' 5 Having said
this, wide currency is given to the concept of terrorism devised by
Schmid and Jongman, which states: "Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring
method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine
individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political
reasons, whereby-in contrast to assassination-the direct targets of
violence are not the main targets."' 16 In addition, the definitions used by
the U.S. Department of State in its annual Patterns of Global Terrorism
are often repeated. According to these definitions,
The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an
audience.
The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens
or the territory of more than one country.
The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or that has
significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.17
15. DAVID TUCKER, SKIRMISHES AT THE EDGE OF EMPIRE 51 (Praeger, Westport,
1997).
16. ALEX P. SCHMID & ALBERT J. JONGMAN, POLITICAL TERRORISM: A NEW GUIDE
TO ACTORS, AUTHORS, CONCEPTS, DATA BASES, THEORIES, AND LITERATURE 28 (North-
Holland, Amsterdam, 1988). This formulation was based upon the authors' study of 109
definitions from which they derived 22 word categories. See id. at 5-6.
17. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terorrism, http://www.state.gov/s/
ct/rls/pgtrpt/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2006). This series of annual reports to Congress is
required by 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(a), and the definition above is used in the reports since it is
contained in section 2656f(d). 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(l)-(3) (2005). "Noncombatant" is
taken to include off-duty military personnel and attacks on military not in a state of
hostilities is likewise included. Under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, "domestic
terrorism" means activities that:
[Vol. 110:3
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As for the legal response, the definition adopted in the United
Kingdom, in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, states as follows:
(1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where-
(a) the action falls within subsection (2),
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or
to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a
political, religious or ideological cause.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it-
(a) involves serious violence against a person,
(b) involves serious damage to property,
(c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person
committing the action,
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a
section of the public, or
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt
an electronic system.
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which
involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not
subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.
(4) In this section-
(a) "action" includes action outside the United Kingdom,
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal
laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2005). For the entire PATRIOT Act, see USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
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(b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any
person, or to property, wherever situated,
(c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of
a country other than the United Kingdom, and
(d) "the government" means the government of the United
Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other
than the United Kingdom.
(5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of
terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a
proscribed organisation.18
The essence of the definition is in section 1(1), which contains three
conjunctive legs, all of which must normally be satisfied (subject to
section 1(3)). It will be noted from section l(1)(b) that terrorism may be
suffered either by the government, including it agents such as the police,
or the public. A suggestion that attacks on the former might amount to
political violence but not "terrorism" 19 is at variance with a growing
body of international law,2 ° with developments in extradition law,2 1 and
with the rationale for having anti-terrorism laws, which is to deal with
forms of organised crime which cannot effectively be handled under
"normal" laws.
Lord Lloyd, in his review of United Kingdom counter-terrorism
laws in 1996, viewed the definition then set out in section 20 of the
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 as too narrow,
especially as it did not catch single issue or religious terrorism. 22 Hence,
section 1 of the Terrorism Act is intended to expand both the forbidden
activities and feared consequences. The Home Office view is that to
limit the application of the definition of terrorism to actions contrary to
the criminal law will not suffice. 3 It would cause uncertainties in
dealing with international terrorism; the police might be unable to act
18. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.). See CLIVE WALKER, BLACKSTONE'S
GUIDE To THE ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION 20-21 (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2002) [hereinafter WALKER, BLACKSTONE'S].
19. NOEL WHITFY ET AL., CIvIL LIBERTIES LAW: THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT ERA 121
(Butterworths, London, 2001).
20. See, e.g., European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977,
90 E.T.S. 2.
21. See GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 113-65 (Nijhoff, Dordrecht,
1991) (discussing application of the political offense exemption).
22. LLOYD OF BERWICK, INQUIRY INTO LEGISLATION AGAINST TERRORISM 5.22 (Cm.
3420, Stationery Office, 1996).
23. See 611 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (Apr. 7,2000) 1484.
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unless and until they were sure that the action in question was contrary to
the criminal law in the relevant country overseas. In addition, there may
be occurrences designed to terrify which are not unlawful, such as a
refusal to perform a duty to keep others safe. Lord Bassam, the
Ministerial spokesman in the Home Office, offered the following
illustration:
For instance, an employee may advance a political cause and may
deliberately omit to update a vital computer programme or omit to
put a cleansing agent in a sewerage system, with the result that the
health of a section of the public was severely put at risk. In our view
that could be terrorism in certain circumstances.
24
The differences between the formulations in the 1989 and 2000 Acts
were the focus of much of the debate concerning the Terrorism Act. The
general allegation is that section 1 is significantly broader than its
predecessor and will affect legitimate political activity as well as
terrorism. In part, it is intentionally broad, as it is mainly the platform
for investigative police powers where there must be some margin of
error; it is not a term on which any criminal offence is based.25 Overall,
it is submitted that the changes in the terms of the definition are not
tremendously significant. Rather, it is the circumstance of how it is then
applied later in the Terrorism Act-the remit-which is worrisome. The
remit is no longer confined in the main to long-established terrorist
groups in Ireland but can potentially affect any domestic or international
involvement in terrorism, whether severe and collective political
violence or not.
Yet, in some respects section 1 is expressly broader than its
predecessor. The Home Office was concerned that the prior focus upon
the word "violence" might limit the legislation to a threat to, or
endangerment of, personal safety. The result would be to leave out acts
which might not be violent in themselves but which can have a
devastating impact. These could include disrupting key computer
systems or interfering with the supply of water or power where life,
health or safety may be put at risk on a broad scale.26 The bombs in the
City of London in 1992 and 1993 and in London Docklands in 1996 may
be further illustrations. In a late modem society, the state is "hollowed
out," and power is diffused across both public and private sectors.
2 7
24. 614 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (July 4, 2000) 1448-49.
25. See 346 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (Mar. 15, 2000) 410.
26. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT & SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND, LEGISLATION AGAINST TERRORISM 10 (Cm. 4178, Stationery Office,
1998).
27. For the concept of "hollowing out," see R.A.W. RHODES, UNDERSTANDING
2006]
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Power relates more to finance, knowledge and security. Consequently,
the likely targets of terrorists shift in line with the new centres of power
and the new power-holders--such as financial institutions in the City of
London. Thus, terrorism becomes less focused upon states and
territories, while the terrorist groups themselves become more fluid and
hybrid in objectives, forms and tactics.28 In this light, section 1(2) seeks
to protect against (b) risks to property, (d) risks to safety and
(e) interference with computer systems.
Yet, it is not certain that the term "violence" as a concept does not
include attacks on property, and it is so defined in the United Kingdom's
Public Order Act 1986, section 8.29 The use of the word "violence" in
connection with property may usefully carry the implication that trivial
forms of damage, such as graffiti, cannot amount to "terrorism."3 ° The
debates in Parliament on the meaning of "violence" in the context of
property attacks were somewhat curtailed when, at the Report stage of
the House of Lords, the government simply replaced the word "violence"
with the word "damage" in subsection 2(b). 31 At the same time, there
was the inclusion of section 1 (2)(e), which is designed to take account of
cyber-terrorism--"serious disruption to computer systems to advance a
political, religious or ideological cause. 32 The emphasis on "serious" is
important--"a costly nuisance" should not be dealt with as cyber-
terrorism.
33
Returning to the precepts of constitutional governance, how does
this definition fit with the needs of society? It could be argued it is too
broad because it is indeterminate as between what were referred to
earlier as direct attacks and indirect attacks on the individual. The
indirect form is not sufficiently linked to the Millian notion of "harm to
others" to warrant intervention. It is true that the forms of intervention,
such as arrest under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and the various
forms of investigative powers in Parts IV and V of that Act, do not
directly criminalise the activity designated as terrorism. But they do chill
such behaviour and demonise it in the eyes of the public. As mentioned
GOVERNANCE: POLICY NETWORKS, GOVERNANCE, REFLEXIVITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
(Open University Press, Buckingham, 1997); A. STEWART, THEORIES OF POWER AND
DOMINATION: THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT IN LATE MODERNITY (Sage Publications,
London, 2001); R.A.W. Rhodes, The Hollowing Out of the State: The Changing Nature
of the Public Services in Britain, 65 POL. Q. 138 (1994).
28. See Xavier Raufer, New World Disorder, New Terrorisms: New Threats for
Europe and the Western World, 11(4) TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 35 (1999).
29. Public Order Act, 1986, c. 8 (U.K).
30. 613 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (May 16, 2000) 235.
31. See 614 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (June 20, 2000) 161.
32. Id. at 160.
33. Mohammad lqbal, Defining Cyberterrorism, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 397, 408 (2004).
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at the outset, a state may also be worthy of protection-at least if it has
sufficient attributes of legitimacy-but just as laws of subversion and
sedition have become increasingly discredited,34 so they should not be
reintroduced by a back door extension of the term "terrorism."
As for definitions of "cyber-terrorism, '35 the threat potentially
emerges through the development of a late modem, information society.
As one commentator observed, "Why assassinate a politician or
indiscriminately kill people when attack on the electronic switching will
produce far more dramatic and lasting results? ' 36 But what is meant by
the cyber-terrorist threat? We must at the outset distinguish various
possible meanings before mapping them onto legal normative standards
and actual legal responses. This task can and must be undertaken in the
abstract for the purposes of legislative contingency planning, but whether
action is taken at any point should also reflect the proportionate
seriousness of the challenge.
An important distinction emerges from the literature between the
use of the Internet in an ancillary role in furtherance of terrorism
("ancillary cyber-activities") and those uses which do themselves
terrorise by using the Internet as the mode or the object of attack ("cyber-
attack"). There is a strong line of literature which contends that only the
latter fall within the definition of "cyber-terrorism." For example,
perhaps the leading analyst of cyber-terrorism, Professor Dorothy
Denning, has argued that:
37
Cyberterrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. It is
generally understood to mean unlawful attacks and threats of attacks
against computers, networks, and the information stored therein when
done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance
of political or social objectives. Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism,
an attack should result in violence against persons or property, or at
least cause enough harm to generate fear. Attacks that lead to death
34. See CLIVE WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAW (2d ed.,
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992) [hereinafter WALKER, PREVENTION].
35. See generally DOROTHY DENNING, INFORMATION WARFARE AND SECURITY
(ACM Press Books, New York, 1999) [hereinafter DENNING, INFORMATION]; Ralph
Stephens, Cyber-Biotech Terrorism: Going High Tech in the 2 1st Century, in THE FUTURE
OF TERRORISM: VIOLENCE IN THE NEW MILLENIUM (Harvey Kushner ed., Sage
Publications, Thousand Oaks, 1998); THE TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSION OF CYBER CRIME
AND TERRORISM (Abraham Sofaer & Seymour Goodman eds., Hoover Institution Press,
Stanford, 2001).
36. Walter Laqueur, Postmodern Terrorism, 75 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 24, 35 (1996).
37. Dorothy Denning, Cyberterrorism (2000), http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/
-denning/infosec/cyberterror.html. See also Dorothy Denning, Activism, Hacktivism,
and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy,
http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/-denning/infosec/nautilus.html (last visited Nov. 24,
2005) [hereinafter Denning, Activism].
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or bodily injury, explosions, plane crashes, water contamination, or
severe economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against
critical infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on
their impact. Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are
mainly a costly nuisance would not.
This limited range is reflected by Professor Gabriel Weimann, who
posits that "cyber-terrorism" means only "the use of computer network
tools to harm or shut down critical national infrastructures (such as
energy, transportation, government operations). '38 Likewise, it is said
that "[c]ybercrime and cyberterrorism are not coterminous.... Terrorist
use of computers as a facilitator of their activities, whether for
propaganda, recruitment, datamining, communication, or other purposes,
is simply not cyberterrorism."
39
Based upon these formulations, only a fraction of what is discussed
below will fall within the term "cyber-terrorism." One can readily
concur that special laws against terrorism should be confined to attacks
which result in serious harm to persons or property.40 Yet, it is
increasingly common for the law not only to deal with a core mischief
but also with the organization and finance which produces and sustains
that core mischief.4' Consequently, it is necessary for the purposes of
this paper to ignore the observations that the wider, more ancillary uses
should be viewed as beyond the strict definition. It is not that the strict
view is wrong, but rather that, to provide a short-hand for the full range
of legal concerns and legal responses, a wider notion of cyber-terrorism
will be adopted in this paper. In effect, it will include not only cyber-
terrorism as a form of offence or attack, as above, but also the various
ways in which the Internet is being used to sustain and further terrorism.
This wider ambit is consistent with the uses of terrorism elsewhere-
those who assist terrorism through finance or the supply of materials
38. Gabriel Weimann, Cyberterrorism: The Sum of All Fears?, 28 STUDIES IN
CONFLICT & TERRORISM 129, 130 (2005) [hereinafter Weimann, The Sum of All Fears].
See also Gabriel Weimann, Cyberterrorism: How Real is the Threat?, U.S. INST.OF
PEACE, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srl 19.html (Dec. 2004).
39. See Weimann, The Sum ofAll Fears, supra note 39, at 132-33.
40. See Iqbal, supra note 34, at 408.
41. For post 9/11 laws in the United States which relate to terrorist finances, see
especially Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079 (Sept 23, 2001); USA PATRIOT
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. Operation Green Quest was created in
October 2001 as a multi-agency financial crimes task force to enforce these and other
laws. See Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War on the Financing of
Terrorism and its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and
Global Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1341 (2004); Walter Parkel, Note, Money
Laundering and Terrorism: Informal Value Transfer Systems, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 183




become depicted as terrorists and are dealt with accordingly under
special legislation.
II. A Typology of Cyber-Terrorism
Moving from definitions to typologies, the variants of cyber-
terrorism include both the ancillary and offensive.42
A. Information Warfare
43
In this aspect of activity, information technology is the means and
object of attack. This mode of use is how cyber-terrorism is often
conceived and is at the heart of Dorothy Denning's definition of "cyber-
terrorism" mentioned earlier. An example of this scenario arose in July
1997, when Spanish protestors, who it must be emphasized might fall
within the definition of "activist" or "hacktivist" but not "terrorist,
'4 4
attacked the Institute for Global Communications (IGC) 45 with thousands
of bogus e-mail messages which swamped the Internet Service
Provider's system and blocked other traffic. The objective was that IGC
stop hosting the website for the Euskal Herria Journal, a New York-
based publication supporting Basque independence, which included
reports on the activities of Euskadi Ta Azkatasuna (ETA), the militant
Basque group.46 IGC staff members were reluctant to succumb to the
pressure, but they said they had to remove the site because the attack had
been crippling the entire service for the company's estimated 13,000
other subscribers.47 Similar tactics were used in 1998 by Tamil activists
who attacked Sri Lankan embassies with an overload of e-mails
messages. More insidious was the attempt by Serb sympathizers during
the war in Kosovo to target NATO with viruses in 1999. 48 Nevertheless,
42. See Timothy Thomas, Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of
"Cyberplanning, " PARAMETERS, U.S. ARMY WAR C. Q. 112 (Spring 2003); Silke, supra
note 10, at 4.
43. See Frank Cilluffo et al., Bad Guys and Good Stuff: When and Where Will the
Cyber Threats Converge?, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 131 (1999-2000); Susan Brenner &
Marc Goodman, In Defense of Cyberterrorism: An Argument for Anticipating Cyber-
Attacks, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1; Silke, supra note 10, at 4.
44. See Denning, Activism, supra note 37.
45. See The Institute for Global Communications, http://www.igc.apc.org (last
visited Jan. 13, 2006).
46. See generally JOHN SULLIVAN, ETA AND BASQUE NATIONALISM: THE FIGHT FOR
EUSKADI, 1890-1986 (Routledge, London, 1988).
47. Id.
48. See Cilluffo, supra note 43, at 149. Likewise, hackers caused an Irish ISP,
Connect-Ireland, to suspend the East Timorese domain (.tp) which it hosted. The
Indonesian embassy in London denied that the Indonesian government sponsored the
attack. See THOMAS C. WINGFIELD, THE LAW OF INFORMATION CONFLICT 24 (Aegis
Research Corporation, Falls Church, 2000).
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fears of terrorists' aircraft falling from the sky through sabotaged air
traffic control systems or of pharmaceutical products becoming
corrupted 49 have not materialized. Systems are generally suitably
complex and can be designed against attack. Furthermore, the death of
people is seen to have more allure for terrorists than the death of
machines. Consequently, there is no clear evidence that more serious
attacks on critical infrastructure via the Internet have been perpetrated by
terrorists, so that computers are more often the means to achieving
terrorist purposes rather than the objects of attack5 °
B. Communications
The Internet is a widely available, fast and cheap mode of
communication. It is especially accommodating for those groups which
have transnational networks. Its facility for encryption is additionally a
boon to those who wish to plot in the shadows. An interesting example
arises from the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was charged as a
conspirator in the September 11h attacks.51 The FBI only discovered that
Moussaoui had utilised three Hotmail accounts through his written
pleadings in July and August 2002. Amongst the challenges faced by
investigators in that case is the initial problem that the identities of
account-holders are not verified by Microsoft, the owners of Hotmail.
Provided the account-holder gives a false identity, 52 does not use a
traceable IP address (which can be achieved by using an Internet
terminal in a public library, Internet cafe53 or shopping mall), and does
not download information to a traceable storage mechanism like a hard-
disk or floppy disk,54 the usage can remain anonymous. Microsoft can in
49. Barry Collin, The Future of Cyberterrorism: Where the Physical and Virtual
Worlds Converge, INST. FOR SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE, available at
http://afgen.com/terrorisml .html (last visited Jan. 13, 2006).
50. See Sarah Gordon & Richard Ford, Cyberterrorism?, 21 COMPUTERS &
SECURITY 636; Weimann, The Sum ofAll Fears, supra note 38, at 130.
51. For the indictment against him, see U.S. Department of Justice, Moussaoui
Indictment, available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/moussaouiindictment.htm (Dec.
2001). He entered a guilty plea in April 2005. Jerry Markon, Moussaoui Pleads Guilty
in Terror Plot, THE WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 23, 2005, at A01. A sentencing trial is
pending. Id.
52. Moussaoui's accounts were called xdesertman@hotmail.com,
pilotzl23@hotmail.com and Olimahammed2@hotmail.com, with his registered name in
one case as Zuluman Tangotango. U.S. v. Moussaoui, Government's Response to Court's
Order on Computer and Email Evidence, available at http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/terrorism/usmouss90402grsp.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2006).
53. Id. Moussaoui was a customer of Kinko's, a company which also strengthens
privacy by wiping the memory of their computers every twenty-four hours. Kinko's,
http://www.kinkos.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2006).
54. Id. The "http" log of the computer that was used will only show that the site
[Vol, 110:3
CYBER-TERRORISM
theory trace messages by a combination of IP address and date/time of
the message, provided the information has not been erased from its
records because an account has been inactive for thirty days; however,
the company refuses to do this as a matter of policy. Even this potential
path to detection can be defeated by the use of more sophisticated
anonymised web browsing systems such as Anonymizer.com. 55 Even Al
Qa'ida has fleetingly made an appearance through websites 56 which have
either been hosted by unwitting legitimate ISPs or furtively embedded
within other websites without the owners' knowledge, with potential
readers being informed of their locations through bulletin boards.57 It is
said that these sites are:
central to al-Qaida's strategy to ensure that its war with the US will
continue even if many of its cells across the world are broken up and
http://www.hotmail.com was visited and not any e-mail details. Id.
55. For attempts to counter these techniques, see C. Walker & and Y. Akdeniz, Anti-
Terrorism Laws and Data Retention: War is Over?, 54 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 159 (2003)
(explaining Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c.24, §§ 102-07 (U.K.). See
also PRIVY COUNSELLOR REVIEW COMMITTEE, ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY
ACT 2001 REVIEW, 2003-04, H.C. 100 Part D, para. 410; HOME OFFICE, COUNTER
TERRORISM POWERS, 2004, Cm. 6147, at para. 145.
56. Thomas, supra note 42. According to Thomas, the sites include the following:
* alneda.com, which US officials said contained encrypted
information to direct al Qaeda members to more secure sites,
featured international news on al Qaeda, and published articles,
fatwas (decisions on applying Muslim law), and books.
* assam.com, believed to be linked to al Qaeda (originally hosted by
the Scranton company BurstNET Technologies, Inc.), served as a
mouthpiece for jihad in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Palestine.
* alnuhrajiroun.com, an al Qaeda site which urged sympathizers to
assassinate Pakistani President Musharraf.
* qassam.net, reportedly linked to Hamas.
• jihadunspun.net, which offered a 36-minute video of Osama bin
Laden.
* 7hj.7hj.com, which aimed to teach visitors how to conduct
computer attacks.
* aloswa.org, which featured quotes from bin Laden tapes, religious
legal rulings that "justified" the terrorist attacks, and support for the
al Qaeda cause.
* drasat.com, run by the Islamic Studies and Research Center (which
some allege is a fake center), and reported to be the most credible
of dozens of Islamist sites posting al Qaeda news.
* jehad.net, alsaha.com, and islammemo.com, alleged to have posted
al Qaeda statements on their websites.
" mwhoob.net and aljehad.online, alleged to have flashed political-
religious songs, with pictures of persecuted Muslims, to denounce
US policy and Arab leaders, notably Saudi.
Id.
57. Michelle Delio, Al Qaeda Website Refuses to Die (2003), available at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/ 0,1294,58356,00.html. The domain name, Al Neda
was later taken over by a private US citizen, Jon Messner. Id.
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its current leaders are killed or captured. The site's function is to
deepen and broaden worldwide Muslim support, allowing al-Qaida or
successor organisations to fish for recruits, money and political
backing.
58
C. Personnel and Logistical Support
Recruitment may be a by-product. The web presence increases
public consciousness of the group, but security demands will not
normally allow any direct approaches.5 9 Nevertheless, some enthusiasts
do risk prosecution, such as Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed,6 ° who is
said to have used Internet chat-rooms to encourage support for his
organization, Al-Muhajiroun, and for Jihadist groups in general.61
Likewise, security considerations limit the role of open websites in fund-
raising operations, but websites for fund-raising have still been more
commonly found than websites for recruitment.62
D. Intelligence Gathering
Since all manner of life is present on the web, it is possible to obtain
information about possible targets, such as defence facilities, 63 as well as
the addresses of individual targets. 64 It is also not just a myth that it is
possible to find instructions on how to make a nuclear weapon 65 or,
58. Paul Eedle, Terrorism.com: How Does AlQaida Stay Organized When its
Members are in Hiding and Scattered Across the World?, THE GUARDIAN, July 17, 2002,
at 4.
59. Yariv Tsfati & Gabriel Weimann, www.terrorism.com: Terror on the Internet,
25 STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORIsM 317, 327 (2002). See also Gabriel Weimann,
www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, U.S. INST. OF PEACE (2004),
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr 116.html.
60. Under pressure from the Home Office because of his activities, Sheikh Omar
Bakri Mohammed left the United Kingdom and has taken up residence in Lebanon. As a
Syrian national, he was later banned from returning to the United Kingdom on grounds
that his return would not be conducive to the public good or to national security. See Ben
Hall, Radical Cleric Bakri Barred from Entry, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Aug. 13,
2005, at 4; Sean O'Neill, Radical Cleric Kept Up Inflammatory Rhetoric Despite
Becoming an Outcast, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 9, 2005, at 1.
61. Sean O'Neill, Radical Cleric Who Has Never Been Prosecuted, THE TIMEs
(London), Jan. 17, 2005, at 4.
62. Tsfati, supra note 59, at 327.
63. British Army facilities in Northern Ireland used to be listed on Sinn Fdin's web-
site. The Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma, attacked in 1995, had been listed on
U.S. militia sites as a facility especially vulnerable to car bombs. Silke, supra note 10, at
15.
64. Section 45 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act of 2001 amends company law
to allow the suppression of personal details of directors so as to protect them from animal
rights activists. Criminal Justice and Police Act, 2001, c. 16, § 45 (U.K.).
65. The Nuclear Weapon Archive: A Guide to Nuclear Weapons,
[Vol. 110:3
CYBER-TERRORISM
perhaps more realistically, a pipe or nail bomb.66 In the case of
Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan, who was arrested in Pakistan in July
2004, his computer materials revealed plans to attack targets, especially
financial institutions, in London, New York and New Jersey; a degree of
panic ensued though it was later confirmed that the plans were three or
four years old.67 Khan is reported to have admitted that "most of al-
Qaeda's communication was done through the Internet., 68 Khan, who is
also known as Abu Talha, "is said to have helped in evaluating potential
American and British targets for terror attacks. 69 It should be noted that
the nature of the intended attacks was probably "conventional" rather
than a cyber-attack, as was the case with other incriminating data from
laptops found in Afghanistan in 2002.70 Nevertheless, Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld observed that an Al Qa'ida training manual recovered
in Afghanistan said, "Using public sources openly and without resorting
to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of all
information required about the enemy. 71
E. Propaganda
In this section, we are moving from web activities which relate to
the preparation or conduct of terror through to the "theater of terror,"
which is aimed at onlookers rather than at victims. 72  In this way,
terrorists can amplify their actions and importance. Some groups operate
their own sites. 73 Examples include Harakat ul Mujahideen (HM), 74 a
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
66. Many sites offer a version of the Anarchist's Cookbook. The original
Anarchist's Cookbook by William Powell, is no longer in print, as the author has
renounced his former views. See Amazon.com Books Page, http://www.amazon.com/
exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0962303208/103-0016069-2583060?v-glance/ (last visited Jan.
14, 2006).
67. See Zahid Hussain, Confessions of a Computer Expert Gave US Vital Clues, THE
TIMES (London), Aug. 3, 2004, at 1; Daniel McGrory, Al-Qaeda Computer Whizkid with
a Flawless English Accent, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 4, 2004, at 4. In the UK, the files
on Khan's computers included a plan of the layout of Heathrow and information from
reconnaissance of the Canary Wharf complex. Michael Evans & Sean O'Neill, How Al-
Qaeda 's London Plot Was Foiled, THE TIMES (London), Nov. 24, 2004, at 4. There were
also suggestions for "picture postcard" targets, such as the Houses of Parliament and
Windsor Castle, and discussions of potential assassination targets. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Weimann, The Sum ofAll Fears, supra note 38, at 143.
71. Thomas, supra note 42, at 117.
72. See GABRIEL WEIMANN & CONRAD WINN, THE THEATER OF TERROR: MASS
MEDIA AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (Longman Group, United Kingdom, 1993).
73. A list is provided by Tsfati, supra note 59, at app.
74. See Harkat-ul-Mujahideen: Latest News & Articles on Jihad & Kashmir,
http://www.harkatulmujahideen.org (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
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militant group based in Pakistan and operating primarily in Kashmir,
which was formed in 1993 as Harakat ul-Ansar. Its prime goal is to
oppose Indian security forces, but it has also attacked civilians and
Western tourists. It is claimed that HM has supporters in several areas of
the United Kingdom, as a result of which its actions are proscribed by
Part II of the Terrorism Act 2000. Another example is the Kurdistan
Workers' Party (Partiya Karker~n Kurdistan or PKK).75 The PKK was
founded in 1974 and seeks an independent Kurdish state in south-eastern
Turkey. It engaged in armed attacks from 1984 until after the capture of
its leader, Abdullah Ocalan,76 following which a ceasefire was called for
on September 1, 1999, though it broke down (save for a short period)
after 2004. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, which was founded in
1972 and is the most powerful group in Sri Lanka fighting for a distinct
Tamil state, has maintained a website since 1997. 77 Likewise, Hizbollah
(The Party of God) is the Lebanese-based Islamic movement founded
after the Israeli military seizure of Lebanon in 1982. It seeks the creation
of an Iranian-style Islamic republic in Lebanon and the removal of all
Israeli and Western influences in the area, including by kidnappings and
suicide bombs. It has in the past maintained a website,78 though the site
has now ceased to operate. The webmaster made the following
comments concerning the site's value to the organization:
"In this technological revolution," explained Hussein Naboulsi, who
runs the website, "one is obliged to get involved in it one way or
another-we can't live outside our era or time. The use of websites
has become like water to human beings, thus it is more than
necessary to keep pace with the means of expression in our time."
Asked if the site has made a difference to the way that Hezbollah is
perceived in the world, Naboulsi was philosophical.
"We don't expect to gain support and sympathy overnight," he
replied by e mail, "though the feedback is great. The good thing is
that thousands of westerners are able to get a picture about the party
directly from our mouth. We receive thousands of e-mails, and we
answer the questions of the people. I remember a westerner, an old
man, wrote to me saying: 'I need you to answer my questions.' His
questions were aggressive, but after a week of exchanging Q&A e-
mails, he wrote to me saying: 'Thanks to God that I know the truth
75. See Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan Worker's Party, http://www.pkk.org (last visited
Jan. 14, 2006).
76. Ocalan v Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, Judgment 12 May 2005.
77. See Tamil Eelam Home Page, http://eelam.com (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).





The objective of these sites is primarily informational. They
contain details of history, ideology, leadership and news; violent
activities tend to be downplayed, although their vindication is
explained. 80  The audience includes both supporters and "the
international 'bystander' public and surfers," with some sites even
seeking to enter the homes and minds of the "enemy.",
81
Because of harassment and threats from the authorities, which often
translate into closure proceedings taken by Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), the sites are operated by sympathisers who speak in more guarded
language. In addition to sites related to organizations, the "propaganda
of the deed ' 82 has been very much adopted by some insurgent groups in
Iraq who have used websites to show the killings of western hostages.
These postings often vanish quickly, but not before they have been
publicized and replicated by legitimate sources as well as the more
outlandish inhabitants of the Internet.8 3
The series began with Nick Berg in May 2004.84 The web addresses
that posted the Nick Berg decapitation video were based on a web server
in Malaysia with webmasters in London, England and Nurnberg,
Denmark. 85 The technique was borrowed from the case of U.S. reporter
Daniel Pearl, who was beheaded by Islamists in Pakistan in February
2002; a video was released of his killing.86 Another widely publicised
event was the killing of Ken Bigley, the first British hostage to be killed,
79. A. Mueller, Propaganda Skirmishes in Cyberspace, THE SUNDAY TIMES
(London), Mar. 23, 2003, at 52.
80. Tsfati, supra note 59, at 321.
81. Id. at 326.
82. "Propaganda of the Deed" derives from the doctrine that spectacular action by an
individual or an activist group may inspire further action by others. See A.H. Garrison,
Defining Terrorism: Philosophy of the Bomb, Propaganda by Deed and Change Through
Fear and Violence, 17 CRM. JUST. STUD.: A CRITIcAL J. OF CRIME, L. AND Soc. 259
(2004). It was associated with anarchists such as Kropotkin, who is associated with the
epigram that "[a] single deed is better propaganda than a thousand pamphlets." Id.
83. See, e.g., Ogrish.com: Uncover Reality, http://www.ogrish.com/index.html/ (last
visited Jan. 14, 2006); World of Death, http://www.everwonder.com/david/worldofdeath/
(last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
84. See, e.g.. Camera/Iraq: The War of Images in the Middle East, Nicholas Berg
Beheading (May 8, 2004), http://www.camerairaq.com/2004/05/nick-berg video.html;
Encoderx: Nick Berg Execution, http:// encoderx.co.uk/nickberg/ (last visited Jan. 14,
2006).
85. The sites were originally located at www.al-asnar.net and www.al-asnar.biz. See
also Alex Jones, Prison Planet.tv, http://www.prisonplanet.tv/articles/may2004/
051104beheadsuscivilian.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
86. Omar Sheikh was convicted of the murder. See Zahid Hussain, A Lonely Wait
for the Hangman, THE TIMES (London), Jul. 16, 2002, at 3 (describing Sheikh's pending
appeal); Video Shows Reporter Killed Then Beheaded, IRISH NEWS, Feb. 23, 2002, at 13;
IRISH TIMES, Feb. 25, 2005, at 21.
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by the group Tawhid wa al-Jihad, which proclaimed allegiance to Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi in October 2004.87 Bigley was seized along with
Americans Eugene Armstrong and Jack Hensley, who were also
beheaded. The drama was enhanced by the dressing of Bigley in orange
overalls and placing him in a cage, intended to be reminiscent of
equivalent uniforms worn by prisoners of the U.S. Government in
Guantdinamo Bay's Camp Delta.88
III. Legal Responses
In terms of legal reactions, we can again corral them into just two
headings: hostile cyber-attacks and ancillary cyber-activities. There is a
legal reaction to each, and the danger in each case is that the legal
reaction may be excessive because of a failure to adhere to the legal
principles adduced earlier.
A. Hostile Cyber-Attack
The first category of cyber-terrorism contemplates various forms of
hostile activity. In short, this category encompasses "information
warfare." Information warfare is terrorist activity designed seriously to
interfere with or to harm or disrupt communication. Information warfare
might involve direct incursions on computer systems which could trigger
threats to life, such as interference with air traffic control systems or
hospital records. However, information warfare is more likely to involve
the defacing of website text or images, the use of viruses, or the denial of
service attacks through multiple key striking software, called "ping"
engines, or through e-mail bombs, none of which causes physical
damage but may fundamentally compromise the provision of information
and services. 89
Does all of this activity have the capacity to terrorise as opposed to
damage or offend or inconvenience? In legal principle, only the truly
terrorising should require a special legal response. One should
87. See Stephen Farrell & Michael Evans, 'Help Me Now, Mr. Blair. You Are the
Only Person on God's Earth Who Can,' THE TIMES (London), Sept. 23, 2004, at 6;
Daniel McGrory, Briton's Family Waits in Fear as US Hostage is Beheaded, THE TIMES
(London), Sept. 21, 2004, at 1; Daniel McGrory & James Hider, Ken Bigley is Beheaded,
THE TIMES (London), Oct. 9, 2004, at 1.
88. Id.
89. See DENNING, INFORMATION, supra note 35; V. Mitliaga, Cyberterrorism LEGAL
EXECUTIVE 4 (2002); J.M. Post et. al, From Car Bombs to Logic Bombs, 12(2)
TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 97 (2002); L. Valeri & M. Knights, Affecting Trust:
Terrorism, Internet and Offensive Information Warfare, 12(1) TERRORISM & POL.
VIOLENCE 15 (2002); Winn Schwartan, Infowar.com, http://www.infowar.com (last
visited Jan. 14, 2006).
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distinguish the direct from the indirect threat and should identify a threat
to the well-being of an individual rather than to a machine. A direct
threat might include interference which could cause aircraft to collide or
cause hospitals to administer the wrong treatment. These could be
paralysing challenges to the capacity of the state to run civil life and, if
carried out, could harm individuals. To the contrary, activities such as
defacing, corrupting or denying are unlikely to have the same impact on
the lives of individuals, even if the potential disruption to the capacities
of state agencies remains large and of increasing significance. These
activities also shade into forms of political activism which we should
hesitate to demonise with the title "terrorism" even if they infringe such
elements of the criminal law as the Computer Misuse Act 199090 or the
Criminal Damage Act 1971.91 Is it "terrorism" for teachers to go on
strike and thus deny to the public important public services any more
than it is terrorism for animal rights protestors to try to bring down a
website? While the direct and indirect may sometimes be conflated in
political discourse, 92 it would ignore principles of various rights (such as
the right to protest and to express opinions) and of proportionality to use
draconian anti-terrorism powers against the latter.
Bearing these criticisms in mind, there is greater justification for
offences relating to intelligence-gathering, including intelligence-
gathering via the Internet, where the outcome could be some kind of
murderous attack on individuals. There are two overlapping offences in
the Terrorism Act 200093 which deal with this activity. One is section 58
of the Act-offences of the collecting or recording or possessing
information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or
preparing an act of terrorism. 94 A "record" includes photographic or
electronic formats as well as writings and drawings, but mental notes and
knowledge which is not recorded in any form are not covered.95
The main controversy surrounding section 58 concerns the
equivocal nature of the actions involved and the fact that it is left to the
defendant to prove as a defence, under sub-section (3), that he had a
reasonable excuse for his action or possession.96 The indeterminate
range of the offence has also given rise to alarm on the part of
journalists: "What journalist worth his or her salt does not have a
contacts book? A cuttings file? A file on the activities and personal
90. Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18 (U.K.).
91. Criminal Damage Act, 1971, c.48 (U.K.).
92. Silke, supra note 10, at 17.
93. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (U.K.).
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details of prominent public figures?", 97
Indeed, one could add that a wide range of people, including
academic scholars, can become effective investigators and collators of
information by using Internet sources such as the website directory
192.com 98 or by using documents freely available on the web, such as
The Terrorist's Handbook and The Big Book of Mischief. It follows that
it is not necessary under section 58 to show that the information was
obtained or held in breach of the law; the possession of Army manuals
was the basis for conviction in R v. Lorenc.
99
Section 58 is augmented for Northern Ireland by section 103 which
relates to the protection of specified security force personnel and other
public officials.'00 For example, the possession of Army manuals was
the basis for conviction in R v. Lorenc'°' and the possession of planning
and training materials was the basis in Re Kerr's Application.10 2 Though
the penalties are the same, section 103 is broader than section 58 in
several respects. For example, the actus reus includes publishing,
communicating or attempting to elicit, as well as collecting or
recording. 10 3 As with section 58, the main controversy concerns the
equivocal nature of the actions involved and the fact that it is left to the
defendant to prove as a defence, under sub-section (5), that he had a
reasonable excuse for his action or possession."°4 In R v. McLaughlin, °5
a radio enthusiast was able to show reasonable excuse for possessing a
list of RUC radio frequencies. There is the further presumption in sub-
section (4) that if it is proved a document or record: "(a) was on any
premises at the same time as the accused, or (b) was on premises of
which the accused was the occupier or which he habitually used
otherwise than as a member of the public," the court may assume that the
accused possessed the document or record, unless he proves that he did
not know of its presence on the premises or that he had no control over
it. 10 6 According to section 118, which applies to both sub-sections (4)
and (5), if evidence is adduced which is sufficient to raise an issue, the
court shall treat it as proved unless the prosecution disproves it beyond
reasonable doubt. 1
07
97. L. Hickman, Press Freedom and New Legislation, 151 NEw L. J. 716 (2001).
98. 192.com Home Page, http://192.com (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
99. R v. Lorenc, [1988] N.I. 94.
100. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 103 (U.K.).
101. R v. Lorenc, [1988] N.I. 94.
102. Re Kerr's Application, [1997] N.I. 225.
103. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 103 (U.K.).
104. Id.
105. R v. McLaughlin, [1993] N.I. 28.
106. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 103 (U.K.).
107. Id. § 118.
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The case of David Copeland might be considered as a test for
whether there should be offences against intelligence-gathering
activities.'" David Copeland carried out a series of three bombings in
London in 1999 out of racist and homophobic motives.'0 9 Part of the
evidence at his trial was that he had obtained the information on how to
make bombs from Internet sources, such as The Terrorists' Handbook
and How to Make Bombs Book Two. These and other relevant materials,
like The Anarchist's Cookbook and The Big Book of Mischief, are readily
available through any search engine. There are, however, two caveats.
The first is that such information is also available in books, including
books written for lay-people."10  Second, it turned out that David
Copeland could not assemble the necessary ingredients indicated in the
web-based guides and instead resorted to an even less sophisticated
bomb made out of fireworks material."' Further reflection shows the
dangers of overreaching. If possession of the addresses of government
buildings amounts to terrorist intelligence, then are we to ban telephone
directories and the use of the Internet to provide government services?
Inevitably, an open society may be more vulnerable to attack than a
closed society, but the better strategies against terrorism lie in activities
such as state intelligence-gathering rather than in shutting down the open
society.
B. Support Cyber-Activities
Other forms of computer use by terrorist groups exist to support
their political or military objectives. The use includes internal and
external communications, fund-raising, recruitment and propaganda.' 
12
These activities do not terrorise per se, so only if they are linked to a
terrorist group should legal action be taken under special laws. In other
words, legal action should be taken not because of a direct capacity to
terrorise but because of the need to reduce the viability of organisations
with the capacity to terrorise by other means. However, if these
108. Silke, supra note 10, at 17.
109. Stewart Tendler & Tim Reid, Soho Bomber Was Wicked Not Insane, THE TIMES
(London), July 1, 2000, at 1.
110. See e.g., G. GRIvAs-DIGNHENIS, GUERILLA WARFARE AND EOKA's STRUGGLE
(Longmans, London, 1964).
111. M. Wolkind & N. Sweeney, R v. David Copeland, 41 MED. Sci. L. 185, 190
(2001). Likewise, the perpetrators of the London suicide bombings of July 7 and July 21,
2005, allegedly manufactured their bombs from peroxide materials which can be derived
from common household goods. Daniel McGrory & Sean O'Neill, Inside the Hunt for
London Bombers, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 6, 2005, at 11.
112. See K.R. Damphousse & B.L. Smith, The Internet, in THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM
(H.W. Kushner ed., Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 1998).
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activities are not linked to a terrorist, and preferably proscribed, 13 group,
then there is again the danger of crossing over into political activism
which, palatable or not, or even legal or not, should not be equated with
terrorism.
The Terrorism Act 2000 does deal with support cyber-activities
relating to proscribed organisations in section 12 of the Act." 4 Part III of
the Act is wider and deals with "Terrorist Property" even if the
organisation is not proscribed. 115  There are again some elements of
overreaching. One example is the offence of possession of items useful
to terrorism under section 57 of the Terrorism Act 2000.116
The offence of possession of items for terrorist purposes in section
57 had been an offence in Northern Ireland since the time of section 30
of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991117 and was
later set out in section 32 of the Emergency Provisions Act 1996.1 " The
offence originated pursuant to the recommendation of the Review of the
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts 1978 and 1987,' 9 though
the idea was then confined to possession in public places. Then, section
63 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 extended a
possession offence to Britain by way of section 16A of the Prevention of
113. Proscription is allowed under Part I of the Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 103
(U.K.). Some groups (both Irish based and foreign) are listed in the Act itself (section
3(1)). Others (all foreign based) have been added by statutory instruments on the
authority of the relevant government Minister (section 3(3)). See WALKER,
BLACKSTONE'S, supra note 18, at ch. 2. This form of proscription triggers offences in
sections 11 to 13 against membership or speaking or organising on behalf of the
proscribed group. The Act therefore includes, but goes well beyond, the prohibition on
the funding of listed non-domestic groups in Title liA of the Anti-terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2005). The grounds for proscription
under the Terrorism Act 2000 are to be further widened by the Terrorism Bill, 2005-06,
H.L. Bill [56], cl. 21.
114. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 12 (U.K.).
115. Id. §§ 14-31.
116. Id. § 57. See also THE PRIVY COUNSELLOR REVIEW COMMITTEE, ANTI-
TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001 REVIEW, 2003-4, H.C. 100 Part D, at para.
276 (expressing no objections to the offences in Part VI of ATCSA). The penalties under
section 57 are to be increased by the Terrorism Bill, 2005-06, H.L. Bill [56], cl. 13.
Furthermore, a new offence is proposed under clause 5(1) of the Bill: "A person commits
an offence if, with the intention of (a) committing acts of terrorism, or (b) assisting
another to commit such acts, he engages in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to
his intention." Id. at cl. 5(1). The new offence covers forms of intangible preparations-
giving information or advice-wheras section 57 demands that the preparation offence
involve some tangible item. See also JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTER
TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 2005-06, H.L. 75-I/H.C. 561.
117. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, c. 24, § 30 (U.K.).
118. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1996, c. 22, § 32 (U.K.).
119. REVIEW OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND (EMERGENCY PROVISIONS) ACTS 1978 &
1987, 1990, Cm. 1115, at para. 2.9.
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Terrorism Act. 120 Continuance was supported by Lord Lloyd as allowing
early police intervention,' 2' and so the offence now appears as section 57
of the Terrorism Act for the whole of the United Kingdom. 122 It has
become one of the most controversial debating points during its passage,
even though it remains largely unchanged since 1994.
According to section 57(1), a person commits an offence if he
"possesses an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable
suspicion that his possession is for a purpose connected with the
commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism."' 1 3 The
penalties are the same as for section 54. 124 There is no need for any
proof of a terrorist purpose in the mind of the possessor. It is notable that
there is again no link to proscribed organisations, so the perpetrators may
include, in accordance with the definition in section 1, animal liberation
activists seeking to attack a laboratory. 25 The articles concerned will be
lawful in themselves and even commonplace; in this regard, section 57
differs markedly from offences such as possession of an offensive
weapon or going equipped for theft. There is no need for section 57 to
deal with those caught red-handed in possession of explosives and
firearms. Rather, items such as wires, batteries, rubber gloves, scales,
electronic timers, overalls, balaclavas, agricultural fertilizer and gas
cylinders, especially in conjunction, are the concern of section 57. The
wide range of articles which may attract suspicion highlights the
problematic nature of section 57. The actions of the suspects at this stage
are highly equivocal-persons with overalls and balaclavas may be
preparing for an attack on a police patrol or on a rabbit warren. In this
way, there is an extension of the criminal law to put people in the dock
for activities which do not require actions directly related to terrorism or
the intention of being involved in terrorism.
Proof of "possession" is aided by sub-section (3). If it is proved that
an article: "(a) was on any premises at the same time as the accused, or
(b) was on premises of which the accused was the occupier or which he
habitually used otherwise than as a member of the public," the court may
assume that the accused possessed the article, unless he proves that he
did not know of its presence on the premises or that he had no control
over it. 26
120. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 63 (U.K.); Prevention of
Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, § 16A (U.K.).
121. INQUIRY INTO LEGISLATION AGAINST TERRORISM 14.6 (Cm. 3420, Stationery
Office, 1996).
122. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 57 (U.K.).
123. Id. § 57(1).
124. Id. § 54.
125. Id. §§ 1,57.
126. Id. § 57(3).
2006]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Recognising the possible overreach of section 57, sub-section (2)
offers a defence for a person charged with an offence to prove that "his
possession of the article was not for a purpose connected with the
commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism."' 127 In
addition, under section 57(3), it is open to the defendant to show that he
either did not know of the presence of the item on the premises or had no
control over it. 128 It has been argued that this defence does not alleviate
the unfairness of the offence and in fact perpetrates another by switching
the burden of proof to the defence, contrary to Article 6(2) of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
29
The meaning of the offence and its possible breach of article 6(2) by
undermining the presumption of innocence have been considered by the
House of Lords in R v. Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte
Kebilene.130 Their Lordships ultimately decided the case on the technical
ground of the non-reviewability of prosecution decisions, but opinions
were divided between the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal on the
complaint of a breach of Article 6(2). 13 1 An illuminating analysis of the
problem was provided in the speech of Lord Hope:
It is necessary in the first place to distinguish between the shifting
from the prosecution to the accused ... the "evidential burden," or
the burden of introducing evidence in support of his case, on the one
hand and the "persuasive burden," or the burden of persuading the
jury as to his guilt or innocence, on the other. A "persuasive" burden
of proof requires the accused to prove, on a balance of probabilities, a
fact which is essential to the determination of his guilt or innocence.
It reverses the burden of proof by removing it from the prosecution
and transferring it to the accused. An "evidential" burden requires
only that the accused must adduce sufficient evidence to raise an
issue before it has to be determined as one of the facts in the case.
The prosecution does not need to lead any evidence about it, so the
accused needs to do this if he wishes to put the point in issue. But if
it is put in issue, the burden of proof remains with the prosecution.
The accused need only raise a reasonable doubt about his guilt.
Statutory presumptions which place an "evidential" burden on the
accused, requiring the accused to do no more than raise a reasonable
doubt on the matter with which they deal, do not breach the
presumption of innocence. They are not incompatible with article
127. Id. § 57(2).
128. Id. § 57(3).
129. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 6(2),
Nov. 4, 1950, ETS 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 17.




6(2) of the Convention. They take their place alongside the common
law evidential presumptions which have been built up in the light of
experience. They are a necessary part of preserving the balance of
fairness between the accused and the prosecutor in matters of
evidence. It is quite common in summary prosecutions for routine
matters which may be inconvenient or time-consuming for the
prosecutor to have to prove but which may reasonably be supposed to
be within the accused's own knowledge to be dealt with in this way.
It is not suggested that statutory provisions of this kind are
objectionable.
Statutory presumptions which transfer the "persuasive" burden to the
accused require further examination. Three kinds were identified by
the applicants in their written case .... First, there is the
"mandatory" presumption of guilt as to an essential element of the
offence. As the presumption is one which must be applied if the
basis of fact on which it rests is established, it is inconsistent with the
presumption of innocence. This is a matter which can be determined
as a preliminary issue without reference to the facts of the case.
Secondly, there is a presumption of guilt as to an essential element
which is "discretionary." The tribunal of fact may or may not rely on
the presumption, depending upon its view as to the cogency or weight
of the evidence. If the presumption is of this kind it may be
necessary for the facts of the case to be considered before a
conclusion can be reached as to whether the presumption of
innocence has been breached. In that event the matters cannot be
resolved until after trial.
The third category of provisions which fall within the general
description of reverse onus clauses consists of provisions which
relate to an exemption or proviso which the accused must establish if
he wishes to avoid conviction but is not an essential element of the
offence....
These provisions may or may not violate the presumption of
innocence, depending on the circumstances.
Two further important points need to be made about this
classification. The first is that this is not an exact science. The
provisions vary so widely in their detail as to what the prosecutor
must prove before the onus shifts, and their effect on the presumption
of innocence depends so much on circumstances. These matters may
not be capable of being fully assessed until after the trial. The best
that can be done, by way of a preliminary examination, is to see
whether the legislative technique which has been adopted imposes a
persuasive or merely an evidential burden, whether it is mandatory or
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discretionary and whether it relates to an essential element of the
offence or merely to an exception or proviso. The second is that,
even if the conclusion is reached that prima facie the provision
breaches the presumption of innocence, that will not lead inevitably
to the conclusion that the provision is incompatible with article 6(2)
of the Convention. The European jurisprudence, which I shall
examine later, shows that other factors need to be brought into
consideration at this stage.
132
In this way, it is desirable to ensure that the interpretation of section
57(3) imposes an initial evidential burden-a requirement to raise
evidence in support of an issue in a case-on the defence but thereafter
the burden is taken up by the prosecution to disprove there is any
defence. It is also important to emphasise that the final burden of proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, including proof of all essential facts,
such as possession and reasonable suspicion of a terrorist purpose,
remains on the prosecution. Such restraint is more likely to satisfy
article 6(2) as interpreted in the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights, which does allow for some flexibility in the issue of
proof, especially where it can be shown that important social concerns
are at stake and that the defendant has ready access to the information
required for the defence. 133
In light of these concerns and conflicting factors, section 118 was
added to the Terrorism Act and affects both sections 57(2) and 57(3).134
According to section 118, if evidence is adduced which is sufficient to
raise an issue, the court "shall treat it as proved unless the prosecution
disproves it beyond reasonable doubt., 135 This formula was intended to
be merely declaratory. 136 In so far as it does impact on the problem,
however, it would seem to prevent section 57 from placing any "legal" or
"persuasive" burden upon the defendant by ensuring that, once raised,
the issue remains for the prosecution to prove.' 37 It may also slightly
ease the evidential burden placed on the defendant by requiring simply
that the issue be raised to negate the presumption in the statute, unless
the prosecution can prove otherwise. 1
38
132. Id. at 378-80.
133. See Salabiaku v. France, App. No. 10519/83, Ser. A 141-A (1988); Brown v.
Stott (Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline) and another, [2003] 1 A.C. 681; R v. Benjafield,
[2002] UKHL 2; R v. Lambert, [2001] UKHL 37.
134. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 118 (U.K.).
135. Id. § 118(4).
136. 613 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (May 16, 2000) 754.
137. See B. EMMERSON & A. ASHWORTH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE para.
9-59 (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2001); J.J. Rowe, The Terrorism Act 2000, [2000]
CRIM. L.R. 527, 540.
138. EMMERSON, supra note 137, at para. 9-59; Rowe, supra note 137, at 540.
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Some commentators suggest that the dispute in Kebilene was
misconceived on the grounds that the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt not only the possession of the items relevant to section
57 but also reasonable suspicion of the terroristic purpose.1 39 In other
words, the burden of proof is not shifted at all.140 A comparison is made
with other offences relating to preparatory stages, such as going
equipped for theft or possession of an offensive weapon. It is suggested
that these analogies are misplaced. The presence of items covered by
section 57 is far less suggestive of crime than is the presence of items
covered by the other offence. In other words, being in charge of false
identity documents, counterfeit credit cards and a three-band radio14 1 is
much less suggestive of terrorism than possession of a knife or a jemmy
is suggestive of an offence against the person or against property. These
are not necessarily acts which are "not wrongful at all,"'142 though they
are less wrongful than using the items in a further crime.
The fact that the offence of possession is based around, in its second
leg, reasonable suspicion only serves to emphasise rather than constrain
its breadth. This does not at all mean that the prosecution has "its work
cut out to prove the required suspicion beyond reasonable doubt."'
43
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a reasonable suspicion harboured in
the minds of the forces of law and order (and not even a guilty mindset
on the part of the accused) is a long way away from proof, in classical
Millian terms, of a harm being actually perpetrated by a wrongdoer.
Rather, the presence of items can be linked, for example, to associations
or expressed beliefs to weave a charge. Thus, the same commentator
concedes that section 57 might be said to trivialise the prosecution's
burden, especially because it also requires no direct proof of a terroristic
purpose.' 44 Quite so. The fact that the defendant has to respond to such
a relatively light burden is surely not much different at the end of the day
than a criticism that the burden of proof is shifted. It is true an offence
has to be proven at the outset by the prosecution, but if that takes no
great effort, then the real task in court is for the defence, which of course
was always the intention of the legislation. It should be part of the
139. See R v. Director of Public Prosecutions, exparte Kebilene, [2000] 2 AC 326.
140. P. Roberts, The Presumption ofInnocence Brought Home, 118 L.Q.R. 41 (2002).
141. For a graphic illustration in the case of Baghdad Meziane and Brahmin
Benmerzouga, see Steve Bird, Quiet Existence in Leicester Suburb Masked Complex
Terrorist Network, THE TIMEs (London), Apr. 2, 2003, at 11; Leicestershire Constabulary
Library, available at http://www.leics.police.uk/library/magnesium-information_
pack.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
142. Paul Roberts, The Presumption of Innocence Brought Home? Kebilene
Deconstructed, 118 L.Q.R. 41, 56 (2002).
143. Id. at 51.
144. Id. at 67.
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prosecution's burden to show direct proof of a terroristic purpose in the
mind of the accused as opposed to a reasonable suspicion in the mind of
the police or prosecutor.
A further argument to be considered is that, if the real issue is about
the formulation of criminal offences rather than burdens of proof, the
European Convention has little relevance since it has nothing to say
about substantive criminal law. 145 Yet this narrow stance is by no means
assured. It is true that elements of criminal liability are substantive
rather than procedural and so fall outside English conceptions of the
presumption of innocence, but the European Convention's sense of
fairness does seem to be much wider in that it is linked to the overall
fairness of process. As was stated in another context in (John) Murray v.
United Kingdom:
Although not specifically mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention,
there can be no doubt that the right to remain silent under police
questioning and the privilege against self-incrimination are generally
recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion
of a fair procedure under Article 6.
... [I]t is self-evident that it is incompatible with the immunities
under consideration to base a conviction solely or mainly on the
accused's silence or on a refusal to answer questions or to give
evidence himself. 1
46
This dictum suggests that an offence which made it unlawful, say, to be
suspected of murder and then fail to answer police questions in response
to those suspicions would not be acceptable. Is that not a statement
about substantive criminal law?
It should be realised that there are inchoate offences aplenty in this
field. Most obvious is conspiracy to cause explosions under section 3 of
the Explosive Substances Act 1883.' 4 Surely it is fairer and more
convincing to prove "conspiracy" rather than "possession" and a specific
wrongful intent-for example, causing explosions rather than terrorism,
which is not per se an offence.
Adding to the debate is the case of Attorney General's Reference
(No 1 of 2004),148 which arose from the impact of section 35 of the
145. Id. at 50. See also Richard Buxton, The Human Rights and the Substantive
Criminal Law, [20001 CRIM. L.REv. 331, 332.
146. App. No. 18731/91, Reports 1996-I at paras. 45, 47.
147. Explosive Substances Act, 1883, c. 3, § 3 (U.K.).
148. [2004].EWCA Crim. 1025.
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Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (procedural points
concerning the holding of preparatory hearings). 4 9 The Court of Appeal
gave the firm guidance that the common law and article 6(2) of the
European Convention had the same effect-both permitted legal reverse
burdens of proof or presumptions in the appropriate circumstances150
The overall burden of proof must remain on the prosecution, but there
could be exceptions provided they created proportionate evidentiary
burdens and were justifiable.' 51 Justifiability would be judged by the
realistic effects of the reverse burden, including how easy it was for the
accused to discharge or how difficult it would be for the prosecution to
establish the facts, bearing in mind the seriousness of the offences and
the level of penalties.
52
Arguably more important than the interpretation of section 57 has
been the considerable increase in its usage over the past three years. The
offence had been charged thirty times in Britain before the Terrorism Act
came into force in 1996. In 2000 and 2001, there were no recorded
charges. 53 Since then, there have been twenty-two charges in 2002 and
twenty-nine in 2003.' 4 In effect, we are now close to an offence of
terrorism-an offence of involvement rather than commission.
The controversial nature of section 57 is illustrated by the case of
Baghdad Meziane and Brahmin Benmerzouga, as described earlier. 55 In
addition, it is not clear why section 58 was not invoked against Babar
Ahmad, a computer analyst who worked at Imperial College London.'
56
He has been accused of material support of terrorism, support of the
Taliban and Chechen rebels, conspiracy to kill (including the possession
of plans for attacking U.S. warships in the Straits of Hormuz), money
laundering, solicitation of funds, and conspiracy. 57 He was also under
149. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 35 (U.K.).




153. 522 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (Oct. 30, 2003) 966W.
154. HOME OFFICE, REPORT ON THE OPERATION IN 2002 AND 2003 OF THE TERRORISM
ACT 2000 Annex D (2004).
155. Bird, supra note 141, at 11.
156. Daniel McGrory et al., Briton 'Had Plans to Attack US Warship', THE TIMES
(London), Aug. 7, 2004, at 1, 4. Ahmad's web sites were based in Connecticut. Id. For
further details of his case, see FREE Babar Ahmad, http://www.freebabarahmad.com
(last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
157. Id. The details of the warrant for arrest are set out at
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/ahmad/usahmad72804cmp.pdf (July 28, 2004). The
warrant document reveals that Ahmad used PGP encryption but that the keys were
readily recovered from data in his residence and in his office at Imperial College,
London. Id. The offence of material support has in part been declared unconstitutional.
See Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1200 (C.D. Cal. 2004);
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suspicion for raising money for terrorists through the websites
www.azzam.com, www.qoqaz.com and www.waaqiah.com, which
Ahmad ran until their closure in November 2001 through internet service
providers in Nevada and then Connecticut.'58 He was arrested by British
authorities in December 2003 but then released, following which the
U.S. authorities commenced extradition proceedings. 159 His extradition
was ordered by the Bow Street Magistrates' Court, after a diplomatic
note sent to Foreign Secretary Jack Straw by the U.S. Government was
produced in court, stating that Mr. Ahmad would not face the death
penalty or be sent to Guantdnamo Bay.160 The decision to extradite was
confirmed by the Home Secretary in November 2005.
Moving towards legislative action against propaganda, there is an
incitement offence in section 59 of the Terrorism Act, which followed a
government review' 6 1 and which potentially requires the United
Kingdom to protect every crazy government in the world. According to
section 59, a person commits an offence if: "(a) he incites another
person to commit an act of terrorism wholly or partly outside the United
Kingdom, and (b) the act would, if committed in England and Wales,
constitute one of the offences listed in subsection (2)."' 162 The listed
offences are:
(a) murder,
(b) an offence under section 18 of the Offences against the Person
Act 1861 (wounding with intent),
(c) an offence under section 23 or 24 of that Act (poison),
(d) an offence under section 28 or 29 of that Act (explosions), and
David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (2003). Sami Omar Al-Hussayen, a student at the University
of Idaho, was acquitted of providing material support to terrorist groups through websites
that prosecutors alleged, in circumstances similar to the case of Babar Ahmad, were used
to recruit and raise money for Hamas and other groups. Richard B. Schmitt, Acquittal in




160. Daniel McGrory, Terror Suspect Loses US Extradition Battle, THE TIMES
(London), May 18, 2005, at 6. In the meantime, he had come in fourth in the general
election of May 2005 in the Brent North constituency. Id.
161. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT & SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND, LEGISLATION AGAINST TERRORISM 16 (Cm. 4178, Stationery Office,
1998).
162. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 59(1) (U.K.).
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(e) an offence under section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971
(endangering life by damaging property). 163
According to sub-section (4), it is expressly "immaterial whether or not
the person incited is in the United Kingdom at the time of the
incitement."' 64 This differs from the extension of conspiracy offences
under sections 5 to 7 of the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy)
Act 1998 which give the United Kingdom courts jurisdiction over acts of
conspiracy in the United Kingdom relating to any offences committed or
intended to be committed abroad. 165 If, however, the conspiracy as well
as the substantive offence takes place outside the jurisdiction, the
conspirators cannot be prosecuted. 166 Corresponding offences to section
59 are set out in section 60 for Northern Ireland 167 and section 61 for
Scotland. 168 Incitement via the Internet is likely to be the commonest
form of address under this offence.
Sections 59 to 61 turn certain offences into universal crimes when
they are not recognised as such elsewhere and in relation to foreign states
which are not within the scope of the Suppression of Terrorism Act
1978.169 Within the context of an incitement from the United Kingdom
to intended perpetrators within a foreign country, how can it be said that
the "incitement" possibly creates an immediate risk of unlawful serious
violence to persons? The immediacy and causal link are diminished
from what one normally thinks of as incitement. It is suggested that the
offences should at least be confined in two ways. First, in terms of
persons, the scope should relate to either the activities of British citizens
or incitements to persons who are in the United Kingdom. This would
leave a wide offence, given the indiscriminate nature of the Internet and
other modern means of communications. Second, in terms of actions, the
list of offences should be more clearly politically related and should not
go much beyond such internationally recognised offences as hijacking,
attacks on internationally protected persons (which already provide for
universal jurisdiction for incitement offences) and perhaps even the
wider range of terrorist bombing offences under section 62.17 If
confined in these ways, the list of offences would then more clearly
reflect the core of terrorism than the current list.
In response, the Home Secretary has argued that sections 59 to 61
163. Id. § 59(2).
164. Id. § 59(4).
165. Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act, 1998, c. 40, §§ 5-7 (U.K.).
166. Id.
167. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 60 (U.K.).
168. Id. § 61 (U.K.).
169. Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, c. 26 (U.K.).
170. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 62 (U.K.).
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resolve anomalies. The aim of the incitement offences is to deter those
who seek to use the United Kingdom as a base from which to promote
terrorist acts abroad. It is claimed that under the Suppression of
Terrorism Act 1978, there is already extra-territorial jurisdiction over a
number of serious offences including murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
wounding with intent, and causing explosions, and incitement to any of
those offences. It is then argued that, given the limitations of the treaty,
"[t]here is no obvious justification for incitement to commit murder in
Turkey or India to be an offence in the United Kingdom, whereas
incitement to commit murder in Japan or Australia is not an offence."'
171
But, as already mentioned, the incitement of many designated terrorist
offences (hijacking and so on) already carry universal jurisdiction.
Further, one wonders how many cases of incitements have resulted in
prosecution instead of extradition under the 1978 Act? 172 From reported
cases at least, the answer would appear to be zero, and this is also the
figure given in debates by the Minister.'
73
Evidential difficulties may also arise, whereby dissident groups will
find it difficult to adduce evidence from overseas as to their true nature
and intentions. 174 On the other hand, repressive regimes will be able to
present evidence obtained by all kinds of unconscionable means.
The government was of the view that there was a need to balance
free speech interests against the unacceptability of "encouraging and
glorifying acts of terrorism. ' ' 175 However, this is one of the areas where a
mature democracy should have maintained its patience with the
politically immature and intemperate. Any prosecutions under sections
59 to 61 will be open to challenge under article 10 of the European
Convention, 176 especially if made by a person who could be designated
as a politician and especially if made against a government.
177
171. 341 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (Dec. 14, 1999) 163.
172. See generally Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, c. 26 (U.K.).
173. H.C. STANDING COMMITTEE D DEB., TERRORISM BILL (6th ser.) (Feb. 1, 2000)
262 (statement of Minister of State Charles Clarke).
174. See JUSTICE, RESPONSETO LEGISLATIONAGAINSTTERRoRiSMparas. 3.6, 3.7 (1999).
175. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT & SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND, LEGISLATION AGAINST TERRORISM 16 (Cm. 4178, Stationery Office,
1998). Exactly these forms of activities are to be forbidden by clause 1(1) of the
Terrorism Bill, 2005-06, H.L. Bill [56]: "This section applies to a statement that is likely
to be understood by members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect
encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation
of acts of terrorism or Convention offences." See also JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, COUNTER TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 2005-06, H.L. 75-I/H.C. 561.
176. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 10,
Nov. 4, 1950, ETS 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 17.
177. See Incal v. Turkey, App. No. 22678/93, Reports 1998-IV (2000); Castells v.
Spain, App. No. 11798/85, Ser. A 236 (1992).
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It is commonly claimed that the use of cyberspace for propaganda
purposes is its most significant terrorist use, but the notion of
"propaganda" is wider than the forms of incitement in the Terrorism
Act.178 So, if, for example, PKK efforts are diverted into humanitarian
protests about the torture and summary execution of 0calan by the
Turkish government, is that still terrorism? Even the occupation of an
embassy is not usually considered to be terrorism. The idea that "once a
terrorist, always a terrorist" is belied by history, including the life stories
of at least one Prime Minister of Israel (Begin), one President of Cyprus
(Makarios) and one President of South Africa (Mandela), assuming open
attacks against colonial and racist regimes would be counted as
"terrorism" in the first place. 1
79
In reality, few terrorist groups have been able to run websites
without attacks in turn from government agencies putting pressure on
ISPs or triggering other forms of counteraction. For example, the Sinn
Fin site, originally at the University of Texas, moved after protests in
May 1996.180 Sites favouring ETA have been closed down in this way,
as described earlier.18' No proscribed Irish group has any website
anywhere in the world, though a few of the foreign proscribed groups do
have a direct web presence. 182 Of course,. it is not necessarily the case
that the law enforcement world would want these websites to be shut
down--electronic intelligence-gathering works both ways. Indeed,
communications, whether internal or external, can of course provide
evidence of conspiracy and have indeed been used as evidence in court
proceedings involving Al Qa'ida suspects. 83  One should not assume
that encryption is always effectively used by terrorists.
Other offences likely to involve the Internet are more justifiable as
178. Silke, supra note 10, at 7, 18.
179. See Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict: Protocols I and II to the Geneva
Conventions art. 49, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391.
180. The site (http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/-sponge/aprn/SFhome.html) moved to a
commercial interet service provider located in Philadelphia. See Sinn Fdin Online,
http://www.serve.com/rm/sinnfein/index.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2006). The site is now
on an Irish internet service provider. See Sinn Fin: Building an Ireland of Equals,
http://sinnfein.ie/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2006). See Stuart Tendler, Ulster Security Details
Posted on the Internet, TIMES (London), Mar. 25, 1996.
181. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen: Latest News & Articles on Jihad & Kashmir,
http://www.harkatulmujahideen.org (last visited Jan. 14, 2006); Markazdawa.org,
http://www.markazdawa.org/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2006); Tamil Eelam Home Page,
http://eelam.com (last visited Jan. 14, 2006); Partiya Karker~n Kurdistan Worker's Party,
http://www.pkk.org (last visited Jan. 14, 2006). Other recently defunct websites include
http://www.hizballah.org/ and http://www.ozgurluk.org/dhkc/.
183. See Al Fawwaz v. Governor of Brixton Prison,- [2001] UKHL 69 (involving
evidence from a facsimile).
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closer to the concept of violence than politics. These include section 54,
which deals with weapons training. 84  Under this section, a person
commits an offence if he "provides instruction or training in the making
or use of-(a) firearms, (aa) radioactive material or weapons designed or
adapted for the discharge of any radioactive material, (b) explosives, or
(c) chemical, biological or nuclear weapons."' 85 This offence has its
origins in successive Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts
(latterly section 34 of the 1996 version), 186 but it has now been extended
throughout the United Kingdom, despite the recommendation otherwise
by Lord Lloyd.187 It is correspondingly an offence under section 54(2) to
receive instruction or training, or, under section 54(3), to invite another
to receive instruction or training contrary to sub-sections (1) or (2) even
if the activity is to take place outside the United Kingdom. 188 In this
way, the offence currently also pertains to recruitment for training as
well as to the training itself. These Changes arose mainly from concerns
about groups seeking to recruit British Muslims, often through the
Internet, for military training in madrassas (Islamic religious schools) in
Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere. By way of interpretation, under
section 54(4), "instructions" and "invitations" can be general, such as by
a pamphlet or via the Internet, or "addressed to one or more specific
persons."' 189  In this way, no identifiable recipient is needed for the
offence to be committed.
Sulayman Balal Zainulabidin, a chef from Greenwich, south-east
London,was charged under section 54 in October 2001 arising from his
activities in running an enterprise called Sakina Security Services, which
has advertised on the web training for Muslim recruits to prepare for
"The Ultimate Jihad Challenge" (some of which was to occur at a facility
called Ground Zero in Marion, Alabama). 90 He was acquitted of all
charges in August 2002; there was no evidence to link him to al Qa'ida
and, over a period of two years, only one person had even applied for the
184. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 54 (U.K.). Any form of training relevant to
terrorism, whether related to weapons or not, will be penalised by the offence in clause 6
of the Terrorism Bill, 2005-06, H.L. Bill [56]. Attendance at a place of terrorist training
is an offence under clause 8. See also JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTER
TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 2005-06, H.L. 75-I/H.C. 561.
185. Id.
186. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, c. 24 (U.K.); Northern
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1996, c. 22, § 36 (U.K.).
187. INQUIRY INTO LEGISLATION AGAINST TERRORISM 14.28 (Cm. 3420, Stationery
Office, 1996).
188. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 54 (U.K.).
189. Id.
190. A mirror of the website is produced at http://www.warbirdforum.com/
webarchi.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
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course via the website.' 9
1
Just as the offence of weapons training has been extended to cover
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and materials, so sections 113
to 115 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 extend
offences relating to uses of weapons and threats and hoaxes concerning
them from traditional areas, such as firearms and explosives, to chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons and materials. 192 By section 113(1), it
becomes an offence for a person to use or threaten to use a noxious
substance or thing to cause serious harm in a manner designed to
influence the government or to intimidate the public. 193  The serious
harm is defined further by sub-section (2) as an action that:
(a) causes serious violence against a person anywhere in the world;
(b) causes serious damage to real or personal property anywhere in
the world;
(c) endangers human life or creates a serious risk to the health or
safety of the public or a section of the public; or
(d) induces in members of the public the fear that the action is likely
to endanger their lives or create a serious risk to their health or safety;
but any effect on the person taking the action is to be disregarded.
The list overall is reflective of section 1(2) of the Terrorism Act, 195 save
that there is understandably no reference to electronic systems. By
section 113(3), it is an offence to make a threat to carry out an action
which constitutes an offence under subsection (1) with the intention "to
induce in a person anywhere in the world the fear that the threat is likely
to be carried out.'
19 6
Section 114 deals with hoaxes with reference to "a noxious
substance or other noxious thing."' 97 The law as it stood before the 2001
Act, in section 51 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 (as amended by the
Criminal Justice Act 1991), made it an offence for someone to place or
send any article intending to make another person believe that it is likely
to explode or ignite and thereby cause personal injury or damage to
191. Tania Branigan, Cleared Chef Says He was Terror Case Scapegoat: Jury
Dismisses First UK Charges Since Attacks on September 11, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 10,
2002, at 6.
192. Anti-terrorism, Crime, and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, §§ 113-115 (U.K.).
193. Id. § 113(1).
194. Id. § 113(2).
195. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 1(2) (U.K.).
196. Anti-terrorism, Crime, and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 113(3) (U.K.).
197. Id. § 114.
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property. 198  It was also an offence under section 51 for someone to
communicate any information which he knows or believes to be false
intending to make another person believe that a bomb is likely to explode
or ignite. 99 There were corresponding offences in Scotland 200 and in
Northern Ireland.20  A related offence is food contamination contrary to
section 38 of the Public Order Act 1986.202 It is an offence under sub-
section (1) to intend to cause alarm, injury or loss by contamination or
interference with goods or by making it appear that goods have been
contaminated or interfered with "in a place where goods of that
description are consumed, used, sold or otherwise supplied., 20 3 It is also
an offence to make threats or claims along these lines20 4 (section 38(2))
or to possess materials with a view to the commission of an offence
(section 38(3)).205 Section 38 responded to a small number of well-
publicised incidents of consumer terrorism, a minority of which involved
animal liberationists. It follows that there was a substantial range of
offences in existence before 2001, but it was felt that there remained
gaps. The offences in section 51 related only to hoax devices which are
"likely to explode or ignite." 20 6 The section 38 offences protected only
the integrity of goods.20 7 Post-September 11, 2001, a scare arose from
the mailing of anthrax powder in the U.S. and the fear that groups like Al
Qa'ida had possession of other biological or nuclear materials which
could be extremely dangerous and harmful not just in the consumer chain
but through any form of contact or distribution.0 8 Accordingly, section
114(1) widens the offence by extending the actus reus to placing or
sending any substance or article intending to make others believe that it
is likely to be or contain a noxious substance or thing which could
endanger human life or health. 20 9 By subsection (2), it is an offence for a
person to falsely communicate any information to another person
198. See WALKER, PREVENTION, supra note 34, at ch. 12.
199. Criminal Law Act, 1977, c. 45, § 51 (U.K.)., amended by Criminal Justice Act,
1991, c. 53 (U.K.).
200. Id. § 63 (U.K.).
201. Criminal Law (Amendment) (Northern Ireland) Order, 1977, SI 1977/1249, art.
3.
202. Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64, § 38 (U.K.). See also S. Watson, Consumer
Terrorism, 137 NEW L. J. 84 (1987); S. Watson, Product Contamination, 84 L. SOCIETY'S
GAZETTE 13 (1987).
203. Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64, § 38(1) (U.K.).
204. Id. § 38(2).
205. Id. § 38(3).
206. Criminal Law Act, 1977, c. 45, § 51 (U.K.), amended by Criminal Justice Act,
1991, c. 53 (U.K.).
207. Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64, § 38 (U.K.).
208. See Clive Walker, Biological Attack Terrorism and the Law, 17 J. OF
TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE 175 (2004).
209. Anti-terrorism, Crime, and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 114(1) (U.K.).
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anywhere in the world that a noxious substance or thing is or will be in a
place and so is likely to cause harm or to endanger human life or
health.21°
For the purposes of both sections 113 and 114, section 115 makes
clear that for a person to be guilty of an offence, it is not necessary for
him to have any particular person in mind as the person in whom he
intends to induce the belief in question.21' Thus, threats and hoaxes
issued to the whole world, such as via the Internet, can be penalised.
IV. Conclusion
Cyber-terrorism is a potential threat, and the United Kingdom state
is justified in seeking to guard against it. As part of its commitment to
that objective, it has set up the National Technical Assistance Centre, a
surveillance advice and interception facility in the Security Services
London headquarters.212
In the realm of asymmetric warfare, the processor can be mightier
than the sword in the hands of terrorist groups. It follows that a flexible
"digital realist" response2 13 is appropriate. This approach may be rather
more subtle than the mantra of Lawrence Lessig that "code is law,''214 in
that it recognizes that code (Internet technical architecture) is subject to
law and that code is as malleable as is law. A digital realist approach to
cyber-terrorism would consider all applicable modalities of control-law
and architecture as well as social factors.
First, in terms of law, the foregoing survey suggests that there are
few gaps and that the difficulties of prosecution are often evidential
rather than substantive. The wish to maintain the secrecy of sources and
surveillance techniques are prominent amongst these, as well as the
problems inevitably caused by having to deal with terrorist networks
which spill into many jurisdictions, some either unsophisticated or
uncooperative, and whose languages are foreign. Subject to that
reservation, one possible strengthening of criminal law might comprise a
210. Id. § 114(2).
211. Id.§ 115.
212. Home Office, National Technical Assistance Centre, http://www.homeoffice.
gov.uk/about-us/organisation/directorates-units/ crcsg/ntac.html?version=l (last visited
Nov. 29, 2005). For a statement of U.S. policy, see The White House, The National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
pcipb/cyberspace strategy.pdf [hereinafter National Strategy]. For further discussion of
the strengthening of technological resilience, see WALKER, CIVIL CONTINGENCIES, supra
note 4, at ch. 4.
213. See G. Greenleaf, An Endnote on Regulating Cyberspace, 21 U. NEW S. WALES
L.J. 593 (2003).
214. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (Basic Books,
New York, 1999).
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new specific offence of denial of service, as suggested by the All
Parliamentary Internet Group. 215 Most Denial of Service attacks already
fall within the Computer Misuse Act 1990216 offences, but a specific new
offence of rendering data "inaccessible" would send a useful signal as
well as avoiding technicalities about the exact mechanism used.21 7
Aspects of civil law may also be relevant as a discipline against those
who seek to profit from, or simply enjoy, the theatre of terrorism. One
might for example, provide for special funds for the victims of terrorism
and their families so they can bring actions in tort218 against those who
reproduce executions and other distressing episodes of terrorism.
Second, Internet architecture points towards the ability to warn and
to filter, techniques which have proven so successful against other
unwanted cyber-intrusions such as spain. 2 19 Finally, social action would
involve the education of the general public as to this aspect of terrorism.
The vigilance of the British public has been a key factor in dealing with
IRA bombings. The same could apply to attacks via the Internet.
Possible outcomes might be the more effective use of filters, warnings
and reporting systems akin to those relating to child pornography
(focused on the Internet Watch Foundation), 220 and even the formation of
counter sites. The Internet Watch Foundation model also reminds us that
the world of cyberspace, most of which rests in private hands, requires
the encouragement of networks of security. This point is explicit in the
U.S. government's National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, which states
that "[t]he cornerstone of America's cyberspace security strategy is and
will remain a public-private partnership. 221
215. See All Party Parliamentary Internet Group, "Revision of the Computer Misuse
Act": Report of an Inquiry by the All Party Internet Group, available at
http://www.apig.org.uk/archive/activities-2004/computer-misuse-inquiry/CMAReport
FinalVersionl.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Computer Misuse Inquiry].
The subsequent Computer Misuse Act 1990 (Amendment) Bill, 2004-05, H.C. Bill [102],
sponsored by the chair of the All Party Parliamentary Internet Group (APIG), fell when
Parliament was prorogued in April 2005. In the U.S., changes after 9/11 included the
Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.A. § 145 (2004), which primarily
increases penalties for computer related offences, and the Cyber Security Research and
Development Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. A. § 7401 (2004), which provides for funding for
research. See also T.M. Raghawan, In Fear Of Cyberterrorism: An Analysis of the
Congressional Response, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 297 (2003).
216. Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18 (U.K.).
217. Computer Misuse Inquiry, supra note 215, at paras. 66, 74.
218. See Wainwright v. Home Office, [2003] UKHL 53; Wilkinson v. Downton,
[1897] 2 Q.B. 57.
219. See D. S. Wall, Digital Realism and the Governance of Spain As Cybercrime, 10
EuR. J. CRIM. POL'Y & RES. 309 (2005).
220. Internet Watch Foundation Home Page, http://www.iwf.org.uk (last visited Nov.
29, 2005).
221. National Strategy, supra note 212, at iv.
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Nevertheless, any or all of these levels of response ought to be
circumspect for two reasons. First, the most effective measures against
any form of terrorism are, on the one hand, intelligence-gathering and
surveillance and, on the other hand, security counter-measures.
Sweeping legislation has the distinct disadvantages not only of being
unproductive but also of giving a signal of undue alarm and potentially
criminalising the political rather than the violent. We must avoid the
panicked conclusion that society's reliance on technology creates an
unalloyed fragility. Instead, we must see it as a strength which often
contains the facility for its own protection.
Next, the urge to restrict, prohibit and to curtail must be resisted.
Aside from the need to encourage dialogue with those so disaffected that
they resort to political violence, websites can be a vital open intelligence
source for the authorities, especially because propaganda is one of the
main aspects of cyber-terrorism. Furthermore, closed sources derived
from information and communication sources are also vital. The
ESCHELON222 system is alleged to be able to "sniff' key switch points
on the Internet and, in that way, intercept a huge amount of traffic.
Given the absence of informants in most cases involving Al Qa'ida and
other tight-knit Jihadist groups, it may be deduced that a fair proportion
of the successes of the authorities in thwarting attacks and undertaking
prosecutions may have been assisted by background signals intelligence.
The pursuit of intelligence may be assisted by the fact that the terrorists
are not as sophisticated as sometimes presented. For example, even
Moussaoui did not use the encryption facilities which are offered by the
popular e-mail services.22 3 Another revealing case is that of Mohammed
Naeem Noor Khan, whose seized computer materials are reported to
have led to a number of further arrests.22 4 His laptop was described as a
"treasure trove" for Western intelligence agencies. 225  Moreover, cell
222. See Cyber-Rights and Cyber-Liberties Home Page, http://www.cyber-rights.org/
interception/echelon/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2005; American Civil Liberties Union,
Echelon Watch, available at http://www.echelonwatch.org/; 2001/2098(INI)) FINAL,
A5-0264/2001 Parl.
223. See supra notes 52-54 and the accompanying text.
217. Zahid Hussein et al., A1-Qaeda 's "British Chief' Is Seized in Police Raids, THE
TIMES (London), Aug. 5, 2004, at 1.
225. Michael Evans, Al-Qaeda Agent's Laptop Yields Vital Intelligence Clues, THE
TIMES (London), Aug. 7, 2004, at 4. Charges were brought against eight individuals:
Dhiren Barot, for possessing reconnaissance plans of the U.S. financial buildings and
having notebooks with information on explosives, poisons, chemicals and related matters;
Qaisar Shaffi, for owning an extract from a terrorist's handbook, which explains the use
of chemicals and explosive devices; Mohammed Naveed Bhatti; Abdul Aziz Jalil; Omar
Abdul Rehman; Junade Feroze; Zia ul Haq; and Nadeem Tarmohammed. Stewart
Tendler et al., Gang Charged with Plot to Hit UK. with "Dirty Bomb, " THE TIMES
(London), Aug. 18, 2004, at 1.
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phones have been used to track terrorists and to provide evidence against
them.
2 2 6
Closing off modes of communication which in some eyes might
amount to "propaganda" must always give liberal democracies pause for
thought. One might especially recall the furious reaction to the
broadcasting of "Death on the Rock" about the Gibraltar shootings in
1988. Even before this time, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher coined a
key phrase in the summer of 1985 after the TWA airline hijack in Beirut.
She told the American Bar Association in London, "We try to find ways
to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on
which they depend., 227 Outright censorship was explicitly imposed only
in November 1988 under broadcast licensing powers.228 The Home
Secretary, Douglas Hurd, based his actions on concern for victims, as
well as on more general political concerns about the creation of fear and
intimidation. 229 The ban included proscribed organizations as well as
Sinn F6in, Republican Sinn Fdin, and the Ulster Defence Association.
The ban was upheld as lawful in R v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ex parte Brind.230 Likewise, the European Commission of
226. See E. Philips, Mobile Phone-Friend or Foe?, 42 ScI. & JUST. 225 (2002).
However, the conviction of Colm Murphy for aiding those who bombed Omagh in
August 1998 by providing mobile phones has been overturned on evidence that police
interview notes had been falsified. David Lister, Omagh Bomb Retrial after Police
"Faked Evidence, "THE TIMES (London), Jan. 22, 2005, at 20.
227. Peter Evans, Thatcher Unfolds Strateg to Beat Hijack Terror! British Premier
Addresses American Bar Association Meeting in London, THE TIMES (London), July 16,
1985.
228. See L. HENDERSON ET AL., SPEAK No EVIL: THE BRITISH BROADCASTING BAN,
THE MEDIA AND THE CONFLICT IN IRELAND (Glasgow University Media Group, London,
1990); D. MILLER, DON'T MENTION THE WAR (Pluto, London, 1994); LORD WINDLESHAM
AND R. RAMPTON, THE WINDLESHAM/RAMPTON REPORT ON DEATH ON THE ROCK (Faber
& Faber, London, 1989); C. Banwell, The Courts' Treatment of the Broadcasting Bans in
Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 16 J. MEDIA L. & PRAC. 21 (1995); M. Halliwell,
Judicial Review and Broadcasting Freedom, 42 N.I.L.Q. 246 (1991); J. Jowell,
Broadcasting and Terrorism, Human Rights and Proportionality, PUB. L. 149 (1990); J.
Michael, Attacking the Easy Platform, 138 N.L.J. 786 (1988); D.G. Morgan, Section 31:
The Broadcasting Ban (1990-92), 25-27 IRISH JURIST 117 (1990-92); N. J. Parpworth,
Terrorism and Broadcasting, 15 J. MEDIA L. & PRAC. 50 (1994); B. Thompson,
Broadcasting and Terrorism, PuB. L. 527 (1989); R. L. Weaver and G. Bennett, Banning
Broadcasting-A Transatlantic Perspective, 13 J. MEDIA L. & PRAC. 179 (1992); R. L.
Weaver and G. Bennett, The Northern Ireland Broadcasting Ban: Some Reflections on
Judicial Review, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1119 (1989). The ban was lifted on
September 16, 1994 shortly after the IRA had called a ceasefire.
229. See 139 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1988) 1082.
230. [1991] 1 A.C. 696. See In re McLaughlin's Application, 1 B.N.I.L. n. 36 [1991],
6 N.I.J.B 4 (1990); R v. BBC ex p. McAliskey, Q.B. (Crown Office List), CO/3032/92




Human Rights upheld limited broadcasting bans.23' One wonders
whether the ban was helpful in preparing the public, especially the
Unionist/Loyalist population of Northern Ireland, for the idea of
accommodation and consocialism, which became the hallmark of the
Belfast "Good Friday" Agreement of 1998.
Of course, some would argue that Millian concepts of harm are
inadequate. There is sympathy for this view in the Canadian Keegstra
judgment:
[W]ords and writings that wilfully promote hatred can constitute a
serious attack on persons belonging to a racial or religious group....
[A] response of humiliation and degradation from an individual
targeted by hate propaganda is to be expected. A person's sense of
human dignity and belonging to the community at large is closely
linked to the concern and respect accorded the groups to which he or
she belongs.... The derision, hostility and abuse encouraged by hate
propaganda therefore have a severely negative impact on the
individual's sense of self-worth and acceptance.
232
Ideally, another reaction altogether is to be encouraged. In the words of
Supreme Court Justice Brandeis, "[the] remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence. 233 Especially since the Internet facilitates
easy, free and instantaneous public discourse, self-assertion is available
to all. The need for cultural education and promotion regarding the
Islamic communities is suggested by the European Monitoring Centre on
Racism and Xenophobia's 234 study of Islamophobia in the European
Union after 9/11 and also by the House of Commons Home Affairs
Committee. 35 In particular, rather than the sole pursuit of a policy of
repression, "the Government must engage British Muslims in its anti-
terrorist strategy. 236 That engagement should take place in cyberspace,
since it has become one of the front lines in the fight against terrorism.
231. Purcell v. Ireland, App. No. 15404/89, D.R., 70, 262 (1991); Brind v. UK, App.
No. 18714/91, D.R., 77-A, 42 (1994); McLaughlin v. UK, App. No. 18759/91, 18 Eur.
H.R. Rep. CD84 (1994).
232. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.R 697, 746 (opinion by Dickson, C.J.).
233. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
234. The EUMC was set up in 1997 by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1035/97. There
are proposals to reconstitute it as the Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union
(COM(2004)693 Final).
235. TERRORISM AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS, 2004-05, H.C. 165.
236. Id. at para. 225.
2006]

